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Over the past weeks, the world has undergone what an Icel-andic commentator recently called the third systemic shock
in the past 20 years: the fall of the Berlin Wall, 9/11, and now
the financial meltdown. We are told that we will never be the
same again. But what we will become is another matter. World
leaders work relentlessly to put Humpty Dumpty back together
again. To stabilize, rebuild and, above all, to re-ignite the fires
of production and consumption. To a green critic, what is at sta-
ke is not just financial restructuring, but the hegemony of the
unsustainable model of development that this financing under-
pins. The body of work that is represented by the present paper
is not about the financial debacle, although it is certainly impli-
cated in it. My work attempts to do something similar though.
It helps to move legal and political discourse beyond the dead
end of a paradigm of environmental law as prop to an unsustai-
nable political economy. Instead, I propose a transformative pa-
radigm that I call “green legal theory”.
Beyond the limits of environmental law
One only needs to read the daily paper to realize that the pro-
mise of environmental regulation has been about as success-
ful as that of financial regulation. Political leaders scramble to
contain the sudden crisis of the latter while they not only igno-
re the chronic crisis of the former, but encourage financial so-
lutions that will actually exacerbate this deeper crisis. This si-
tuation points to limits that are inherent to the very conception
of environmental law. Environmental regulation is a bust on
substantive grounds, because at every level, the planet’s
environment is on a critical downward trajectory. The superfi-
cial attention being paid to climate change ironically reinforces
this situation as it is now virtually equated with the environ-
mental problem: solve climate change, and we can go back to
business as usual. Never mind the disappearing species, loss
of agricultural land, collapsing fisheries, habitat destruction,
and so on. But we can’t go back to business as usual; climate
change as a problem isn’t solvable, especially in light of reduc-
tion in emissions that scientists suggest is necessary. Solving
such problems through state-based regulation is the false pre-
mise of the environmental law paradigm. How, after all, is one
to resolve the fact that the state itself is as dependent on envi-
ronment-destroying economic behaviour as any corporation or
consumer? As a result, the very existence of the environmen-
tal law paradigm reinforces a false ideology. Even worse, this
paradigm has an essentially monopolistic status, “occupying
the field” of discourse so as to exclude completely more critical
understandings. The primary strategic goal of green legal the-
ory (GLT) is to shift this debate as a precursor to action.
Given the above critique, green re-formation starts not with
a realistic need to reform the current environmental regulato-
ry regime but with an investigation of what might actually un-
derpin a sustainable world. In other words, GLT is essentially
about backcasting from an understanding of what is necessa-
ry, and then to consider what we need to do now to begin the
tasks that might get us there. GLT does and can not take exis-
ting and unsustainable political and economic practices as the
given on which new regulations are constructed. To do so has
fatally bracketed what law is able to achieve. Instead, GLT ne-
cessarily examines what a green world would look like, what
alternative social practices might be sustainable. That investi-
gation demands that we problematize many processes that are
now mere background.
This green tack points to a redefinition of the field of law. For
example, a green legal enquiry must address a broad array of
material practices. This comprises not just the creation and use
of energy or wood or fish, but also of capital and labour and tech-
nical knowledge. One must also address the ideal side of these
practices, for example, what forms and institutions of intellec-
tual discourse and political dialogue are needed before we can
even consider such changes. This shift in focus quickly moves
thinking from law as a practice of problem-based regulation to
law as a process of cultural, material or ideal reconstitution.
Law and political economy
When one begins to critique environmental law from such a
perspective, one is immediately struck by its sub-theoretical cha-
racter. Environmental law internalizes the essentials of liberal de-
mocratic theory, and it does so implicitly. The state is the source
of the environmental regulatory progress; few lawyers, in North
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ation of economic wealth, political ecology analysis can take
many tacks. My own perspective has been shaped by my activist
experience in numerous resource battles in western Canada that
dramatically illustrate the spatial character of our treatment of
nature and wealth. Explicating this perspective is a special con-
tribution that geographers bring to political economy (Lefebvre
1991). Such theorists think about the environment less as a set
of disembodied resources than as a broader orientation to how
we demarcate space, set cultural and territorial boundaries, and
establish flows of power horiziontally across distance and verti-
cally up and down social and institutional structures. As Marx
long ago remarked about the globe-shrinking effects of capitalist
technology, capitalism represents the conquest of space through
time. That conquest is not only environmental, but social.
Of special significance is the evolution of place, particularly
insofar as that term might connote historically self-maintaining,
eco-cultural spaces (M’Gonigle / Starke 2006). In the quest for
the spatial transfer of resources, pursuant to a globalizing mo-
del of economic development, one can see how such places have
been historically deconstructed. This deconstruction, including
to longstanding processes of governance and representation,
was the flip-side to the constructed character of an unsustaina-
ble modernity. The centralizing effect of state law is directly re-
levant here. This is widely noted in the hundreds of acts of le-
gislation that allowed for the enclosure of the commons, a
spatial change that re-defined land as physically bounded, that
is socially exclusionary, private property. This change provided
the underpinning for the rise of mercantilist trade upon which
the European state was built. Another example might be how,
in the English common law world, the emergent state gradual-
ly transferred lay or communal regulation from local authori-
ties to an expert judiciary that substituted national for local cus-
toms in their decisions (Blomley 1994). 
Yet another example has been demonstrated in a recent stu-
dy of how the conception of property has evolved from one re-
plete with internal obligations and responsibities to one that
views ownership as exclusive, without embedded social obliga-
tions. This loss of internal controls necessitated the develop-
ment of external (state-based) regulation that is then seen as con-
straining what is otherwise a natural freedom, rather than
inherent to it (Coyle / Morrow 2004). Again, as a North Ameri-
can activist, my analysis has been influenced by the eco-anar-
chist critiques of scholars such as Murray Bookchin, as well as
the American bioregional movement that focuses on eco-cultu-
rally delineated regional configurations as a natural basis for go-
vernance. From a legal perspective, an important lesson is to un-
derstand that the modern state is merely the embodiment of a
recent 400 years set of spatial configurations and, in emascula-
ting place, not a particularly natural set at that! 
A pluralist perspective
The advent of GLT comes at an interesting time in legal the-
ory. In the 1970s, legal theory was encompassed by the field
America at least, are even aware of the historic trade off between
the state’s essential commitment to capital accumulation and its
variable commitment to democratic legitimation. Environmental
lawyers certainly do not import this contradictory situation into
their legal analysis. What is one to do where industrial regulations
entail a reduction in consumer demand that, in turn, has negati-
ve economic and political costs for growth-dependent govern-
ments? The attitude is that the problem is simply an absence of
political will. Similarly, environmental constraints are seen to exist
within an enhanced market process, one that can simply be made
more efficient were it to internalize externalities, with few lawyers
ever considering the contradictions to corporate competitivieness
that such internalization poses.
As its name suggests, GLT is above all a theoretical field be-
cause it uncovers the assumptions and dynamics embodied by
existing processes of regulation, and takes them apart in order
to work past them. As a theoretical enquiry, therefore, GLT
eschews the limited focus of environmental law on the physical
environment in favour of a critical and more complete under-
standing of the social and institutional dynamics of unsustaina-
bility. In comparison with this challenge, environmental law has
become an essentially technical discourse operating within the
very forces it should be challenging. Activist environmental law-
yers feel these limits and the associated frustration in their bo-
nes. But they treat these feelings as reflecing their personal va-
lues rather than as integral to a field that simply cannot address
the problems of capitalist growth and bureaucratic rationality.
Wealth, space and place
Instead, as a theoretical enquiry, GLT must try to explicate
the dynamics of that world as a socio-cultural construction.
What is at stake is the constitution of this world if you will. To
understand its systemic dynamics, GLT can draw from politi-
cal ecology or, more precisely, ecological political economy. Clas-
sically, political economy has addressed, in Adam Smith’s love-
ly formulation, “the nature and causes of the wealth of nations.”
This field has long been concerned with the contributions of
labour and capital to economic wealth and, to a lesser degree,
land and the rents that can be generated from it. When you pre-
face political economy with the word ecological, you emphasi-
ze what has long been neglected in the analysis of where our
wealth comes from, the contribution of nature. This contribu-
tion has long been minimized, for example, in the foundatio-
nal “labour theory of value” where nature has no economic va-
lue until it is transformed by labour, a valuation process that is
problematic for many reasons not the least of which is its pu-
rely social character. In an example of the performativity of the-
ory, this exclusion of nature from the insights of 18th and 19th
century economic theory translated historically into the 20th
century consumer and throwaway society. 
Today, a pervasive lack of awareness, indeed lack of respect,
exists for the real physical and social realities from which our da-
ily wealth emerges. In exploring nature’s contribution to the cre- ,
of jurisprudence, a somewhat dry and overly analytical field la-
cking in political and economic critique. In North America, the
late 1970s saw the rise of the critical legal studies movement,
that then gave way to a diversity of new forms of critical scho-
larship: feminist, critical race, postmodernist, and indigenous
legal theory to name but a few. These new forms all challenged
the positivist, liberal frame of legal education and jurisprudent-
ial analysis. One of the more interesting theoretical innovations
in recent years is legal pluralism, a field that challenges the no-
tion of law as being exclusively the domain of the state. Rather,
families, religious orders, the shop floor, prisons; a plurality of
social structures have internal legal orders that function in a
compelling regulatory fashion.
From a green perspective, legal pluralism opens up the me-
aning of law in important ways. For example, in light of the spa-
tial analysis above, an ecologically sensitive pluralist analysis
casts fresh meaning on the legal conception of terra nullius by
which colonial powers have been able to displace indigenous
cultures on the basis that they do not constitute organized so-
cieties with a claim to exclusive sovereign control over invaded
lands. This legal construction, unacceptable to today’s legal plu-
ralists, underpins the legal order through which unsustainable
economic, political and legal practices have been instantiated
within the modern state system. Yet, in many formerly coloni-
al states such as Canada, the recent process of treaty-making and
land claims resolution remains predicated on this legal concep-
tion, insofar as aborignal groups must establish their rights to
land according to critera that emanate from Western concep-
tions of sovereignty, exclusivity, ownership and control. An eco-
logism that is sensitive to the importance of the historical con-
struction of space and flows thus sees law as growing out of and,
in turn, reinforcing larger forms of eco-cultural organization.
In other words, modernist legal systems enshrine the state both
as a facilitator of economic colonization and as an exclusive sour-
ce of political legitimacy supported by a structured system of for-
mal laws, in Marxist terms, “modes of regulation” that supports
a larger cultural context characterized by complementary “mo-
des of production”.
Law as culture
Rather than taking these modes as the assumed context of
environmental work, GLT’s central focus is on the ecological
character of their nature and operation, and on their alternati-
ves. As a body of critical legal theory, GLT analysis is also neces-
sarily sensitive to contemporary Foucauldian insights. These si-
tuate regulatory power as extending beyond formal conceptions
of the state and government, that is, governmentality, to inclu-
de more subtle forms of internalized patterns of normalized be-
haviour and obedience, that is, biopower. In this broad complex
of considerations, GLT inevitably expand the concepts of legal.
It is neither simply the laws of the state nor even the laws of
other groups referred to in the literature on legal pluralism. In-
stead, this analysis suggests that regulation exists at a cultural
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level, certain practices and behaviours are socially allowed, even
mandated, while others are not. To live without an automobile,
especially in North America, or even without a clothes dryer is
aberrant behaviour. Even more difficult would be to attempt to
self-manage the collective resource uses of your local neighbour-
hood or region, something that was common practice in indi-
genous nations or even in many medieval communities but
which confronts countless obstacles in modern societies, such
as private property, individual choice and a raft of legal impedi-
menta. These larger cultural and spatial constructions are effec-
tively the laws of the consumer society. To encompass how so-
ciety is fully regulated, I would expand the definition of law to
refer to the “authoritative processes of cultural self-constitution”.
To put it another way, we cannot change many legal rules, in the
narrow sense, without first changing the practices that authori-
tatively constitute culture.
A new natural law?
To act differently, we need to think differently. To date, howe-
ver, western societies have largely reacted to systemic decline,
and not debated, let alone acted for, systemic re-formation. For
the green theorist, this situation poses a problem insofar as one
might believe that a sort of meta change is necessary. To make
that suggestion, one confronts the charge of making an insen-
sitive, universalizing claim. Instead, it is safer to suggest that
green thinking is just another competing perspective that needs
to be added to the mix.
Yet this situation sits uncomfortably with ecologists who take
seriously the massive scale and frightening pace of environmen-
tal decline. Not only are these changes global in scope, and are
undoing millions of years of evolutionary diversity and systemic
complexity, but they are already having significant adverse im-
pacts on the world’s poorest peoples and some of its most subt-
le bioregional cultures. It is thus not uncommon to hear envi-
ronmentalists argue that modern society must still obey the laws
of nature. But therein lies the problem, just what are these? And
what are their implications? Population control in India or a re-
duction in the levels of consumption in the United States? How
are we to know, and who is to say? These are difficult questions,
but any theory of socio-cultural regulation that seeks to address
global ecological problems cannot avoid dealing with them.
Take, for example, the word nature itself. Such concerns ab-
out universalized meaning bedevils that word. It has many me-
anings: the nature of things, the natural world, natural law,
things following naturally. In recent years, the word has been
the source of much controversey, social theorists arguing that
nature is socially constructed while natural scientists, not sur-
prisingly, dismiss such arguments as poppycock. Of course, they
say, there are forests and fires, hurricanes and viruses, lakes and
water, life and death. Indeed. And most cultures have words for
most of these things. But not all, and it would not be easy to be
certain that what one culture’s word for tree or snow was under-
stood by others in the same way. Forests there may be; but how
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one thinks about it, defines it, relates to it is certainly a product
of one’s social circumstances. And many cultures have no word
for nature itself, and ours would be hard pressed to identify it.
For some theorists, such as Bruno Latour, the very idea is a
symptom of the modernist compulsion to separate humans
from the natural world (Latour 2004; Castree / Braun 2001).
It is no coincidence that positivism arose in the Western
world, and did so at the expense of naturalist philosophy, in pa-
rallel with the ecologically-devastating political and economic
developments discussed above. This new philosophical develop-
ment promised human liberation, not such a bad thing to the
extent that naturalist thinking in, say, the 16th century was lar-
gely dictated by a repressive institutional theology. Yet positivist
philosophy is, above all, a philosophy of social separation from
nature: the elevation of scientific reason above mystical expe-
rience, of method over substance, of man over nature. Descar-
tes’ dictum “I think, therefore I am” is justly famous as it encap-
sulates this movement so well. Yet the socially self-referential
character of positivist thinking, “I”, was, and continues to be, a
problem for ecological thought. Indeed, the greatest loss with
the displacement of natural law thinking was not just its rich di-
versity of socio-natural ways of knowing, but the more general
loss of the cultural duty to make society accountable to some-
thing outside of itself.
Two related elements of positivism, however, point to a way
beyond this modern or postmodern quandary, that is, to a new
way of thinking that might overcome the socio-natural split wi-
thout doing so in a dangerously universalist manner. First is po-
sitivism's commitment to truth; to scientific facts that can be ve-
rified through rational procedures. Second is a social linearity,
a commitment to ongoing progress which these facts and truths
and neutral processes are seen to serve and, which in turn jus-
tifes their importance. Economic growth is one of the best exam-
ples of this ongoing commitment to progress. But the world
doesn’t quite work that way. Facts are contextual, we have more
facts about the ozone layer than ever before in human history,
but we only needed them because we have been destroying it.
We have material progress on a scale that was unimaginable to
anyone only a few generations past, but achieved by undermi-
ning the conditions for life itself. Reason isn’t absolute; nor is
the individual. They are relational. In this light, the recovery of
dialectical thinking is, perhaps, the signal challenge for a natu-
ralist ecological philosophy. This is not the dialectics of a sim-
plistic Marxism that is still committed to some linear progress
to a proletarian utopia, even if getting there was to take place
through the dialectic of historical materialsm. Instead, as has
become better understood with the rise of systems theory, the
essence of essence is not one fact or thing or direction, but re-
lationships, and complex, subtle ones at that.
Thus, for humans, there is no nature out there to be under-
stood better and better so that we can progress; there is only a
socio-nature wherein we are always involved in the world we stu-
dy or manipulate, and from which we can never stand apart.
There is no separation of one’s place, only the continuing dia-
lectic of space and place. There is no material world that under-
pins the ideal ways in which we think; only a mutual penetra-
tion of one with the other (1). There is no complex system that
can be managed; there will always be surprise from the un-
known. Thus, a way of thinking that is truly naturalist today
would be one that recognizes the inevitable limits of a detached
reason and pure science, and that situates knowledge not only
in the pure mind of reason and science, but in the body of emo-
tions, feelings, and physical experiences. This discussion helps
explain, for example, both the appeal to ecologists and the con-
troversy for scientists and regulators, of the German-inspired
precautiouary principle that tells us to act even on the basis of
uncertainty, but act in a precautionary manner. This is the prin-
ciple that points us away from and industrialism of a hubristic
risk assessment and toward a post-industrialism of a respectful
risk reduction. Similarly, the challenge of a new ecological ra-
tionality is less about bringing nature into some form of repre-
sentation in the social sphere, as (still) rationalist philosophers
such as Bruno Latour suggest and more about bringing society
into nature – whatever that might be.
This inevitable contradiction is, I would suggest, at the heart
of a new natural law to which ecologists are drawn and for which
GLT can offer some guidance. We now know enough to know
that we cannot know. Thus the human animal of the ecological
age is less the wise species with the final answer, homo sapiens,
than the questing one that always seeks to understand how bet-
ter to situate social truths in natural ones, knowing that there is
no answer. That is in the nature of things, and a new natural law
demands that we become accountable again to that nature. If
consciousness has led some cultures to become distanced from
the natural world, the social and natural challenge that results
is to work to overcome that distancing in the shaping of our so-
cial and inevitably natural worlds. In contrast to centuries of so-
cial progress based on the centralizing compulsion to deny or
override contradiction, indeterminacy and surprise, the challen-
ge of the age of ecology is to devise more diverse and grounded
ways of living and being that can work with, not against, the phy-
sical world. We do not, and cannot, know the truth. But we do
know enough to act. It is time for a leap of reason. But leap to
where?
R-Evolution and Re-Formation
The great American poet, T.S. Eliot, has been oft quoted for
his dialectical insight that humans will “not cease from explo-
ration and the end of our exploring will be to arrive at where we
started from, and know that place for the first time.” If the pla-
net, and all that it sustains, is to be around in a fashion that hu-
mans will wish to explore in the future, it is time to begin our
exploration of new futures that can reshape our modernist cul-
tures. Despite our dire circumstances, this is not a call for revo-
lution – though given the resistance of existing power structu-
res, many will be tempted – because revolution is often but a
challenge to specific legal structures within an unchanged ,
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cultural context. Our task is instead to foster a diverse “r-evolu-
tion”, that is, a radical new future which does not seek primari-
ly to change laws or power structures within an existing cultu-
ral context, but to reshape culture in more profound ways. To
do so, we must change social experience.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider the specific
strategies of this r-evolution (2). I will only do so briefly. How-
ever, the premise of these strategies must be a skepticism of am-
bitious centrally administered social engineering based on the
claims to expert knowledge. This sort of self-referential, self-ag-
grandizing planning is what we are now witnessing with the
G20 industrial nations working to reinflate the very financial,
production and consumption systems that are responsible for
the ecological crises that these leaders ignore. Instead, any stra-
tegies must be based on the dangers of contexts that distance
the mind from the body, that recognize instead the limits to cen-
tralist knowledges, that seek to operationalize the socio-natural
truth of social humility, and to do so by working with, rather
than against, the physical world of which we are a part and
which is manifest in cultural and natural diversity.
In some ways, by advocating reforms, GLT risks returning to
the environmental legalisms that it seeks to displace. This co-
nundrum is inevitable, and is irresovable if it asks existing struc-
tures of power to make changes that would undermine the sour-
ces of their power. GLT’s re-formation program is thus, first, a
deconstructive one against those self-reinforcing structures. This
perhaps inherently marginalizes the value of GLT or, at least,
makes it realistically dependent on some degree of systematic
collapse before it can have an effect. Many thoughtful, and main-
stream, critics have come to a similar conclusion, that systemic
rebuilding awaits catastrophe, what Homer-Dixon calls “catage-
nesis” (Homer-Dixon 2007).
Reduce, reduce, reduce
The new economic era into which we are heading provides
unusual opportunities. But it is highly questionable that, without
extensive even catastrohpic decline, this context will allow us to
address what is truly needed, a cultural consensus to grow into
a world of non-growth. This re-formation would be legal in the
broad sense of the word as I have used it above. It would be con-
stitutional, looking beyond the historic structures of the centra-
lized state and the capitalist economy that are both implicated in
the creation of a global culture of unsustainability. In a new eco-
constitutionalism, new forms of political organization will be
needed that are much more attentive to the dialectics of space
and place as well as the material and ideal worlds that these con-
textual constructions allow. It would look to new forms of econo-
mic innovation that, drawing on the vast literature in ecological
economics, would radically decrease demand, maintaining a
stock of capital with a minimum of entropic economic flows. Un-
like the growth economy, its mantra would be to “reduce, redu-
ce, reduce”. To achieve this would necessitate a foundational com-
mitment to social equity and equality; inequity being a driving
force for growth that must be overcome as a prerequisite to dra-
matically reduced growth. There would be far less attention to
more efficient automobiles and much more to creating carfree
cities, and to transforming the labour force to achieve this. And,
of course, it would be radically democratic at all levels to allow
such socio-ecological innovations to emerge from the diverse ex-
periences of people living collectively in place. After a while, be-
cause it would be situated in more sustainable, equitable, and
calmer economic processes that were not always chasing after,
or cleaning up behind, new growth, it might actually be able to
reduce the chaos and the noise of modernity so much that we
might even decrease politics itself. Reduce, reduce.
But devising workable strategies for change is actually the
easy part. Before that, we must do the seemingly impossible.
Environmental law has long defined the problems to be solved
according to what might be acceptable to the structures that have
created these problems in the first place. And it has failed. The
first challenge is to overcome the cultural closure on meaning-
ful dialogue. In this regard, it is hoped that green legal theory
can help to make it possible to consider what the problems we
face actually might be.
Annotations
(1) If the current financial crisis tells us anything it is the reverse of this, how a
structure of belief, faith and confidence underpins our constructed economic
and material world. The dangers here are obvious when reality can be made
so remote from the checks and balances of grounded social experience.
(2) These reforms will be more extensively addressed in my forthcoming
book: Michael M’Gonigle: R-evolution: law, culture and green transforma-
tion.
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